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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECT OF IDENTITY ON CONFLICT IN SYRIA 
 
AYHAM ALHUSEEN 
MA. Thesis, July 2017 
Thesis Supervisor Asst. Prof. Kerim Can Kavaklı  
Since the conflict started in Syria in 2011, the borders between identities started 
to grow and the identity started to emerge as one the main issues in the Syrian conflict.. 
To understand the role of identity in this conflict, I collect and analyze data from inside 
Syria. This rare dataset gives us an insight about the perception of the Syrian people 
inside Syria.  I find that the different identities (Arab and Kurdish) reacted in a similar 
manner to some questions while they reacted differently to others. When asked about 
their migration or post conflict preference, both Arabs and Kurds reacted similarly and 
the identity did not have an effect. However, when asked about their support to an 
initiative as a possible solution to the conflict or how they perceive the role of the UN in 
the conflict, the responses of the Arabic participants were different than the Kurds.  
 
Keywords: Syria, Conflict, Identity, Migration, Ethnicity, Post-conflict.  
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ÖZET 
 
SURİYE’DEKİ ÇATIŞMADA KİMLİK ETKİSİ 
 
AYHAM ALHUSEEN 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi Temmuz 2017 
Tez Danışmannı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kerim Can Kavaklı 
 
Suriye’de 2011 yılında başlayan çatışmadan beri, kimlikler arası Sınırlar 
büyümeye başladı ve kimlik, Suriye’deki çatışmada temel konulardan biri olarak boy 
göstermeye başladı. Bu çatışmadaki kimliğin rolünü anlamak için ben, Suriye’nin 
içinden veri toplayıp analiz ediyorum. Bu nadir veriler bize, Suriye’nin içindeki Suriye’li 
halkların yüzdesi hakkında bir fikir vermektedir. Ben farklı kimliklerin (Araplar ve 
Kürtler) bazı sorulara, diğer kimliklere farklı reaksiyon gösterirken, aralarında aynı 
biçimde reaksiyon gösterdiklerini keşfettim. Onlara göç veya çatışma sonrası tercihleri 
sorulduğunda, Araplar ve Kürtler’in benzer şekilde tepki veriyorlar ve kimlik herhangi 
bir etki göstermiyor. Bununla beraber, çatışmaya mümkün bir çözüm olan açılıma 
bunların desteği sorulduğunda veya çatışmada Birleşmiş Milletler’in rolünü nasıl 
buldukları sorulduğunda, Arap katılımcıların Kürtler’den farklı cevap verdiği 
görülmüştür. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Suriye, çatışma, kimlik, göç, etnik köken, çatışma sonrası. 
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1. Introduction 
Syria has a lot of diverse identities which have been living with each other for a very 
long time. Those identities coexisted and lived in a peaceful manner for the most part. 
However, since the conflict started in Syria in 2011, the borders between these identities 
started to grow. Armed groups from each identity started to emerge with the purpose of 
protecting the group from the other groups. Those armed groups started to fight each 
other which made the gap grow even bigger. Each group started to promote its own 
interest as the only solution to the crisis in Syria. The current destruction of Syria is not 
merely the infrastructural or physical destruction but it is also a process of societal 
devastation. 
This research explores the effect of a person’s ethnic identity on the way they see the 
solution for the Syrian crisis. There have been several initiatives by the international 
community to stop the violence in Syria. These initiatives had mixed responses from the 
different parties on the ground inside Syria. This research will explore how one’s identity 
can change their attitude towards such an initiative. The focus will be on how the Arabic 
and Kurdish ethnicities are affecting the current conflict in Syria. With few previous 
work that focuses on identity in Syria, especially the ethnic one, it is important to examine 
this topic. The Syrian conflict’s effect is spreading over a wide area of the world and its 
consequences can last for generations to come. A report from News Decoder describes 
the reasons behind the Syrian conflict’s importance as “for a mix of reasons — historical, 
religious, geographic and geopolitical — Syria now represents one of the world’s biggest 
and thorniest challenges as it spawns a refugee crisis and puts Russia and Iran on a 
possible collision course with the United States and its allies” (News Decoder, 2015). 
Another report from The Hill states that the Syrian conflict “has fueled the biggest 
refugee crisis since World War II” (Fabian, 2016). The same report include a statement 
from Barrack Obama where he says ““The situation in Syria … haunts me constantly” 
(Fabian, 2016). Many political and media sources provide some inconsistent reasons 
behind the conflict and the situation on the ground inside Syria. But it is hard to find any 
coverage about the opinions of Syrian people about it. The lack of accessibility and 
communication methods, security risks, and many more reasons makes it very difficult 
to get the perception of the Syrians inside Syria about the conflict. 
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For my thesis I communicated with Syrian citizens who are still inside Syria at the 
time of data collection through an online survey. The survey consisted of questions about 
respondent’s background and three issues related to the war. One part was about how the 
conflict will end and which party might win the war. The first part contained a 
hypothetical initiative to solve the conflict presented by the United Nations UN. It asked 
the participants about their attitude towards the initiative. This part included a survey 
experiment where some of the participants were presented with the initiative without the 
support of any international party, while the remaining participants were presented with 
the initiative with the support of the US government. The experiment reflected no 
difference in the responses of the control or the treatment groups which might be a result 
of several factors. However, when the responses of the Arabic participants are compared 
to the Kurds, a difference in the attitude is detected. Some Arabic participants totally 
rejected the initiative while no Kurdish participants did. The perception of the role of the 
UN was also different between the Arabs and the Kurds. More Arabic participants 
thought that the UN is supporting the Assad regime than the Kurds, even though a 
considerable amount of the Kurdish participants did think that its role is supporting the 
regime. Secondly, the survey also included questions about the migration and why the 
respondents did not leave Syria. The responses of both the Arabs and the Kurds were 
similar with the majority having the means of leaving but they wanted to stay. The third 
part of the survey was about the post-conflict reconstruction. I asked the respondents 
whether they would prefer cash or training after the war. The identity here did not show 
an effect and the majority of the Arabs and the Kurds preferred training over funding 
after the war. 
This research provides an important insight about the cause and effect analysis about 
the role that the identity plays in the Syrian conflict. The Syrian conflict is still new and 
very little work has been done about it. Most previous research provides some 
information with surveys about the opinions of the Syrian citizens focusing on single 
variables without examining the connection to other variables and factors that might have 
a cause and effect relationship with them. The ethnic identity has also received very little 
attention and more focus should be directed towards it to identify the role it plays in the 
Syrian conflict in particular and in conflicts in general. 
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Before discussing the conflict itself, it is important to discuss the structure of the 
Syrian state and the historic relationship between the different identities in Syria. This 
will be the next section. Then a discussion about the previous literature available on the 
main topics discussed in this thesis and about the Syrian conflict. Then the research 
design and methodology is presented to explain how the data was collected and what the 
survey design is. Afterwards, a summary about the sample is presented with the main 
descriptive statistical information about their geographical distribution, educational 
background, and gender distribution. Then the main findings are presented in three 
sections; the first is about the end of the conflict and their expectations about who will 
win and how. This section includes the findings for the survey experiment. Second, is 
the migration preferences and why they stayed and where they expect to be in five years. 
Third, the post conflict findings are presented and the support preference in that period. 
The final part includes the conclusion of the thesis. 
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2. Background about the Identities in Syria 
The Syrian Arab Republic is a small country in the Middle East. It is usually referred 
to as Syria, and has Damascus, The world’s oldest inhabited capital, as the capital. The 
history of Syria goes back to thousands of years BC. The word Syria is most likely 
derived from the name of the Neo-Assyrian Empire established in the 10th century BC 
in the region. Many empires across the history took control of Syria. Some of those 
empires were established and vanquished on its lands. With the controlling powers 
changing over time, many ethnicities and religions inhabited the country across the 
history, and this diversity still exist until today. 
The current state of Syria was established after the World War I ended in 1916. When 
the Ottoman Empire retrieved from the Levant area, the Levant was divided by France 
and UK after the Sykes-Picot Agreement into Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. The 
states that resulted from the agreement still has a lot of conflicts within them and they 
still suffer from violence, oppression, terrorism, and many other problems that affect not 
only the people living there or the neighboring countries, but the entire world is being 
affected by the outcomes of these problems. 
 One of the most important and deep issues in the area is the different ethno-religious 
identities of the inhabiting people which are mostly distinguished by Ethnicity, Religion, 
or a mixture of both. Some of the major identities that exist in Syria include; Arabs, 
Kurds, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Alawism, Assyrians, Yazidis, Druze, and more. Each 
of these identities has its own characteristics and unique bonds to the other identities. 
Figure (1) is a product of the Gulf2000 project by Micheal Izady. It maps the 
geographical distribution of the main identities in Syria (Izady, 2010). This paper will 
focus only on the Arabs and the Kurds in Syria and how each identity is responding and 
being affected by the current conflict. It is worth noting that Arabs are divided into 
smaller groups based on religious background. The Sunni Muslim Arabs are the majority 
in Syria with almost 60% of the population while the Alawites Muslim Arabs represent 
around 12% of the Syrian population. The Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims and they 
represent 9% of the total Syrian population. 
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This chapter will describe the Syrian state before and after 2011 when the conflict started 
in Syria with a focus on the Arabs and Kurds within this structure and the main events 
that affected each of these identities within the past 50 years. 
Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of Main Identities in Syria (Izady, 2010) 
 
 2.1. Before 2011 
The Structure of the Syrian State 
In 1946, the last French soldier evacuated from Syria and it became a fully 
independent state. The new state was not stable and during the first ten years it witnessed 
multiple coups and change of governing authority. The Baath political party; an Arab 
nationalist socialist party was established in 1947. The main objective of the Baath party 
is to create the Arabic nation from the Arabic gulf to the Atlantic Ocean which includes 
the MENA region. It considered the Syrian state to be transient state that was created by 
the invaders and it should be merged with the other Arabic nations to create the united 
Arab nation.  In 1958, a step towards this dream of creating the unified Arabic nation 
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happened. Syria and Egypt united to create the United Arab Republic with Jamal Abdel 
Nasir the president of Egypt as the president of the new state. With this new state, all 
Syrian political parties were dissolved including the Baath party which advocated for the 
union. However, this union was ended in 1961 by a coup of Syrian military officers and 
the union dissolved. 
In 1963, the Baath party seized control of the Syrian state and became the ruling power. 
Hafiz Al Assad was a member of the Baath party and he became the minister of defense 
in 1966. After three years, in 1970 Hafiz Al Assad leads a coup and overthought the 
president at that time and became the president while keeping the Baath party as the 
ruling party. Hafiz remained the president until he died in June 2000. His second son 
Bashar Al Assad became a president afterwards, and he is still the internationally 
acknowledged president until the writing of this document in 2017.  
The rule of the Assad family depended heavily on the military forces and security 
branches. Ahed Al Hendi (2011) identifies the main four security directories in Syria as, 
Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, State Security, and Political Security. The 
heads of two of these branches are Alawites1 which is the Islam sect that the Assad family 
was from, while the heads of the other two are Sunnis2 which is the majority of the Syrian 
population. But this is only in theory, the Assad family controls everything in the country 
and the connections with the Assad family overrides the ranking position within the 
institutes. Al Hendi explains it as, “A lower-ranking officer with ties to the Assad family, 
might possess greater authority and privileges than his superiors, simply due to family 
connections.” Al Hendi goes on to describe the results of this mechanism as; “Many 
Syrians have, unfortunately, experienced first-hand the nepotism, corruption, and 
ruthlessness of the fear factories run by this inner circle.” (Hendi, 2011). Which is the 
actual situation on the ground. The Syrian state had institutes that will function on the 
low to middle level citizens, but it does not apply to higher class citizens with connections 
to the Assad family or their relatives. If the person in charge of a certain service had a 
connection to the Assad family or one of the people supported by them, they will be 
unaffected by laws and regulations. This applies to all aspects of life from the high-level 
                                                 
1 The Alawites are an offshoot of Shia Islam who revere Ali, the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-
in-law (Spencer, 2016). 
2 Sunnis regard themselves as the orthodox branch of Islam. The name "Sunni" is derived from the 
phrase "Ahl al-Sunnah", or "People of the Tradition". The tradition in this case refers to practices based 
on what the Prophet Muhammad said, did, agreed to or condemned (BBC News, 2016). 
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trade and economic aspects that all had to benefit an Assad family member to be able to 
exist. To the low-level services where employees can take charges and bribes to provide 
that service to the people despite it being their right. Examples to basic services where 
people usually had to pay to get them done include; travel documents or permits, 
educational documents, complicated lawsuit judgment, identification papers, police 
intervention for some issues… and many more. Syrian citizens knew and learned how to 
live with the corruption that was deep into the country’s institutes and it became a rule 
of life. 
It is also notable that the Syrian Arab Republic has witnessed a very long state of 
emergency. It was declared in 1963 when the Baath party seized power, and it continued 
until the revolution started in 2011 when the Assad regime declared that it was over and 
replaced it with antiterrorism laws. According to Alarabiya channel, it was the longest 
state of emergency in the modern states history (Alarabiya, 2011). The state of 
emergency gave the Syrian government very wide power over the Syrian citizens. The 
security forces practically were able to do almost everything without legal liability. The 
detainees were supposed to not be detained for more than three years, but in real life this 
can go on for much more than that. The Syrian citizens would stand in customary courts 
with no idea where they are, who are its members and without the right to defend 
themselves or being a citizen. (Alarabiya, 2011). This unlimited authority and the ability 
to abuse citizens without consequences has maintained fear and the lack of feeling of 
belonging to the normal citizens without being affiliated with the Assad family or the 
security forces.  
The Arabs in the Syrian Arab Republic 
When talking about the Arabic ethnicity in Syria, it is clear from the name of the 
country the depth and strength of the connection. Even though the name of the Syrian 
state in English is the Syrian Arab Republic. In the Arabic language, the order of the 
words is different. The name in Arabic language is The Arab Syrian Republic. This is 
important because in theory, the Arabic origin and belonging is a higher priority than 
belonging to the Syrian state. The nationality of a Syrian citizen when filling an official 
document is expressed as “Arabic Syrian” regardless of the ethnicity or the origin of the 
citizen. It is assumed that the Arabic ethnicity is the container to all other ethnicities in 
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the country. This is advocated by the government and the Baath party for the future 
Arabic nation that it aims to create.  
This might create the impression that majority Arab citizens are the ones controlling the 
country. However, this is not the actual situation on the ground. The Baath party and its 
principles was a mere front to the Assad family’s power over the country. The Assad 
family is from an Alawites background. For this reason, the Alawites were at an 
advantage than the other Arabic groups within the country. The main leaders of the 
military were Alawites and they were given an advantage over all other groups within 
the security forces and other state institutes. Which created contempt and dissatisfaction 
among the majority Sunni Arabs. The Sunni Arabs felt that they were discriminated 
against and that the country was held down by this group that oppressed and corrupted 
its structure and institutes. An attempted revolution against the Assad regime happened 
in 1982. The Assad regime used extreme violence and successfully oppressed it with tens 
of thousands of Syrians massacred and many more disappearing within the regime’s 
prisons in the following years. The results of this attempt created a lot of fear and 
suppressed hatred towards the regime and its group from the majority of the Sunni Arabs 
in Syria. 
The Kurdish Syrians 
The Kurds are a major component of the society in the Levant area. They played a 
major role in its history and many of the leaders of the area’s community were from the 
Kurdish ethnicity. They coexisted with the other components of the society with no major 
conflicts before the recent history. However, this started to change after the oppressive, 
unjust governments that took over the area, especially Syria. Other than the results of 
these governments that affected all the ethnicities from corruption and oppression and 
other negative effects, these governments started some activities that damaged certain 
components of the population and cracked the structure of the Syrian society. As Akram 
Albunni describes it, “In Syria, the aspects of a "Kurdish national problem" were revealed 
only by the succession of undemocratic authorities whose legitimacy derived from an 
ideology saturated with nationalistic intolerance, with no place in diversity, respect for 
human rights and the interests of other ethnicities” (Albunni, 2004). One of the major 
events that were executed by these authorities that affected the Kurdish Syrians was the 
exceptional population census in 1962. This census excluded more than 70 thousand 
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Kurdish Syrians from the Syrian nationality and treated them as foreigners. The number 
has increased now to almost three hundred thousand. Another event that created deep 
issues between the Arabs and the Kurds in Northern Syria was the Arabic Strap project 
in the early seventies that aimed to create and Arabic barrier between the Syrian Kurds 
and the other Kurds in neighboring countries. The construction of the Ufrat dam created 
the opportunity to remove all the Arabic villages in the area that was flooded by the water 
to the area close to the borders in the north and giving them lands that the Kurds claim it 
was taken from them. The conflict on these lands continue until today with both sides 
claiming ownership of it. In 2004, a Kurdish uprising in the north-eastern part of Syria 
started against the regime’s injustice but it was successfully oppressed with hundreds of 
victims and more pressure on the Kurds in that area. 
There are also some Kurdish nationalist parties that advocate to create the Kurdish State 
which will group parts from Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq together to create this state. 
The advocacy towards this state by some Kurdish political parties and the advocacy 
against it by the Assad regime created some fear and distrust between the Arabs and the 
Kurds.  
 2.2. After 2011 
In mid-March 2011, the Syrian revolution started against the Assad regime. The 
revolution was encouraged by the Arabic Spring where many other revolutions against 
the dictatorships in the MENA region has emerged. The Syrian revolution was 
spontaneous and unorganized. It aimed to free the country from the oppressive regime 
and create a democratic state that will overcome the oppression and the dictatorship that 
it suffered from for more than 40 years.  
The revolution started with peaceful movement that was faced with extreme violence by 
the Assad regime. The regime considered all demonstrators as traitors and terrorists. The 
security forces would use live bullets against the demonstrations to kill the participants 
and impose fear on the people to stop the demonstrations. Anyone who is suspected to 
participate in the demonstrations would be arrested and sent to one of the security 
branches without trial or the ability to contact or find out where they were taken. During 
detention, extreme types of torture are used against the detainees that cause permanent 
disabilities and death. In most cases, when a person dies in detention the bodies are not 
given to their families and only their ID cards are given and the families are told that the 
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person is dead. Human Rights Watch published a report based on Caesar’s 50,000 photos 
from the Assad security agencies that describes this process3. The report mentions the 
testimony of Maryam Hallaq, the mother of Ayham Ghazzoul which was arrested by the 
Assad security forces which states, “they gave me a piece of paper and sent me to 
Tishreen Military Hospital –the Forensic Medicine department—where they gave me a 
[death] certificate stating that Ayham had been killed” (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
The report mentions that they did not return Ayham’s remains to his mother, and they 
did not provide her with any of his personal effects. 
The Assad regime’s violence caused the peaceful movement to deviate from its course 
and it attempted to defend itself by force. The cycle of violence escalated as more and 
more violent methods were used by each side and the regime officially started to use the 
military with all its capacities to oppress the revolution. Heavy machinery including 
Tanks and armed vehicles, air force including jets and helicopters, even ballistic missiles 
were used against civilian areas. The revolution turned into a war and the peaceful 
movement faded in favor of violence. 
The Arabs 
The Sunni Arabic majority areas were the areas that witnessed the strongest response 
to the revolution. The biggest demonstrations that almost paralyzed the regime happened 
in Homs, Hamah, Deir Ezzor, and Daraa in 2011. With the progress of events the regime 
lost more than 60% of Syria in favor of the rebels. Most of these areas were Sunni Arabs 
majority. However, the regime used its air force to torture these areas and daily bombing 
targeted all vital institutions within them. Hospitals, electricity and communications’ 
facilities, even schools were targeted by those attacks. With the focused attacks comes 
the indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas where many people die on daily bases. The 
regime made sure that the areas that goes out of its control would suffer severe 
consequences. This is the reason that Sunni Arabic citizens tend to be affected more by 
the war.  
                                                 
3 Caesar is a defector who left Syria with tens of thousands of images, many showing the bodies of 
detainees who died in Syria’s detention centers. A team of international lawyers, as well as Syrian activists, 
interviewed the defector, codenamed “Caesar,” who stated that, as an official forensic photographer for 
the Military Police, he had personally photographed bodies of dead detainees and helped to archive 
thousands more similar photographs (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
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After the revolution began, the rebels tried to reject the identity that was created by the 
regime in the past years. Starting with the flag, the rebels considered the current flag to 
represent the Baath party and its regime. They raised a new flag which was used before 
the Baath party controlled the country and they rejected the current flag of the Syrian 
state. They also created a coalition of the main rebel political powers, with the help of 
outside supporters, and the coalition created a temporary government that also rejects the 
Assad regime’s government. These activities, and some other similar ones, increased the 
crack of the Syrian identity between the rebels and the regime. 
The rebels fought ISIS from the beginning and they were the mostly affected by it. Most 
of the lands that ISIS controlled were taken from the rebels including Al-Raqa, Deir 
Ezzor, and large areas in Aleppo and Damascus’s countryside. A military operation 
called The Ufrat Sheild, in Arabic “تارفلا عرد”, supported by Turkey helped the rebels to 
regain control on some areas in Aleppo’s northern and eastern countryside. As this 
operation fought against ISIS, it was aiming to stop the Kurdish forces from connecting 
the eastern part of the areas that it controls to the western part.  
The Kurds: 
The Kurds had a more organized political leadership that has been active for many 
years and they had a different approach to the revolution. They participated on smaller 
scale in the peaceful movements and the armed forces of the Kurdish parties did not 
interfere against the regime. In fact, they reached some sort of an agreement with the 
regime. The Kurdish forces and agencies in some cities like Qamishli and Hasakah are 
functioning in parallel to the regime’s agencies. The regime’s authorities have decreased 
and it stopped interfering in many aspects of the lives of the people and it still has its 
military and security branches in those cities while the Kurdish armed forces are working 
in the same cities as well. There is also some coordination between the regime and the 
Kurdish forces but the relationship is not clear or public. A report published on 
Independent includes a statement from one of the leaders of the Kurds in Syria. “The 
overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad by Isis and rebel groups that are affiliated to al-
Qaeda would be a calamity for the world”, says the Syrian Kurdish leader Saleh Muslim 
(Cockburn, 2015). The report continues to describe that “The Syrian Kurds, previously 
marginalized and discriminated against by the Damascus government, have become 
crucial players in the country’s civil war over the last year” (Cockburn, 2015). Still the 
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relationship is difficult to describe. Another report by Al-Monitor describes this 
relationship in the case of Aleppo when the rebel forces retreated from it as “This 
apparent coordination between the Syrian regime and the Kurdish People's Protection 
Units (YPG) against armed groups that were keeping Sheikh Maksoud under steady fire 
have prompted comments about "Kurdish-regime cooperation." But it is not that simple. 
What we have is friendship and enmity coexisting” (Tastekin, 2016). 
This relationship has kept the Kurdish controlled areas from suffering as much as the 
other areas in the Northern part of Syria. The services are damaged especially electricity, 
water, and connections but not as much as the areas that was in the middle of the armed 
conflict. The armed conflict did not reach many of the Kurdish controlled areas and the 
destruction by the bombing and shelling of the regime did not target them at all. They 
did however create their own management which is called Self-Management Agency and 
they later declared their intention of creating a local government in the areas under their 
control. The Kurdish armed forces and political parties use the flag of Kurdistan, the 
planned state of the Kurdish nationality, in parallel to the Syrian flag. The parties that 
ally with the rebels use the flag that is declared by the rebels as the Syrian flag while the 
parties that ally with the regime use the regime’s flag. However, both use the same 
Kurdistan flag. 
The Kurdish forces created the Democratic Forces of Syria which includes some Arabic 
and Assyrian armed groups but its majority and leadership is from the Kurdish nationalist 
PYD party’s armed forces. These forces with the support of the USA mainly could push 
ISIS back from many areas in the northern part of Syria. These forces are considered by 
its supporters a tool to fight ISIS. However, it is considered by the Arabs and Turkey to 
be a threat to the area as it gives the Kurds control over large areas in the northern part 
of Syria. 
2.3. Demographic Change 
The vicious war had a huge effect on the civilians living in Syria. The estimated 
numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees state that more than 6.3 
Million IDPs exist inside Syria, and almost 5 Million refugees live in neighboring 
countries, Egypt and Europe. Figure (2) shows the map made by Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC) which presents the numbers of Syrian refugees and IDPs 
by mid Jan 2017 (ERCC, 2017). These numbers when compared to the Syrian population 
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which is estimated to be around 23 Million by 2010 shows that almost half of the Syrian 
population has left their homes to become either a refugee or an IDP. This process is 
changing the structure of the Syrian community and creating deep problems that will 
require generations to stop the conflicts emerging from it after the war is over. 
Each of the parties fighting on the ground in Syria faces accusations of creating 
demographic change in favor of its supporters. The Sunni Arabs are accused of pushing 
Shi’a and Alawite Muslims out of their homes while the Kurds of bushing the Arabs out 
of their areas, and the regime faces the largest accusations of removing the Syrian 
nationality of its opposition while giving it to foreign militias that fight along its side.  
Figure 2: IDPs, Syrian refugees, and Palestinian refugees from Syria (13/01/2017) (ERCC, 2017) 
 
The refugee crisis is also affecting the Syrian identity. With the sixth year of the conflict, 
many of the refugees in other countries are settling and becoming used to their new 
environments. As the time progress, it will be harder for them to return to their homes 
after it is destroyed by the war and with difficult circumstances and very poor services 
including especially education and health services. 
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3. Literature Review 
 3.1. Ethnicity and Conflict 
Ethnic identity is hard to measure. Individuals simply do not conform to any single 
identity, especially those based on ethnicity. The “pure” origin of the person is considered 
to signal more belonging than “less pure” ones. The purity is measured by the family and 
ancestors of the group member. Turton describes ethnicity as it has no meaning beyond 
the “imagined” sense. It is based on collective belief in the existence of the community 
(Turton, 1997). Roland Hsu sets three main aspects of ethnicity; first, ethnicity is 
considered a problematic issue that is testing societies. Second, ethnicity is used to create 
a seemingly homogeneous social group whose members are assumed to have similar 
attributes. Third, ethnicity is considered to cover other elements of social classification 
like class (Hsu, 2010).  
When discussing the conflict caused by identity, it is usually focused on collective 
violence which can be defined as “an infliction of violence deliberately carried out by 
actors who are, or perceive themselves to be, part of a group with a common purpose 
beyond the immediate act of violence” (Brzoska, 2007). As Tilly argues “the 20th 
Century had more collective violence than any other century of the previous 10,000 
years” (Tilly, 2003).  However, ethnicity, religion and other identities often have 
dynamic relationships to conflicts. It can be one of the main causes for conflicts and it 
affects the way the conflicts are handled. Some consider it to be the reason why conflicts 
become violent. When individuals get very attached to their own identity and they create 
barriers between themselves and other identities, sectarianism manifests itself. Al-
Qarawee (2013) argues that, “sectarianism lacks features that could make it a 
constructive or stabilizing force. It is based on conflict-oriented narratives, fed by mutual 
hatreds and victimizations” (Al-Qarawee, 2013). Examples of such violence can be 
found in Rawanda and Sri Lanka. Economic and other factors does not explain the 
conflict and its results there. Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein states that “it is clear 
that the Hutu rebels wished to kill selectively, just as the Sinhalese rioters sought to 
murder only Tamils. The goal in both cases was to eliminate members of the out-group 
while protecting one’s own co-ethnics” (Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2002). This 
shows the negative role that identities can play in conflicts when they are separated. It 
can create a negative attitude towards other parties and their actions. The rejection of any 
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solution to the conflict presented by an “enemy” identity usually happens and the solution 
is less likely to be accepted. Even when it holds no harm to the other identity and the 
solution is the best available option.  
Another example can be found in Sudan. In Jok’s discussion about identity where the 
identity in Sudan was unified into a single one and all other identities were excluded. Jok 
states that “Arabic and Islam as an interconnected model of homogenizing the people of 
Sudan. The ideology is too rigid and it rejects any negotiation and compromise over these 
twin models” (Jok, 2013). Any solution that compromises those identities cannot be 
accepted or tolerated. Solutions that present new identities are immediately rejected 
without negotiations. Not only the rejection of solutions, identity can lead to one solution 
over the other. (Beber, Roessler, & Scacco, 2014) Finds that exposure to Southern 
Sudanese rioting in Khartoum makes Northern Sudanese respondents more likely to 
support the secession of the South and less likely to support Southerners remaining as 
citizens in the North.  
On the other hand, Jenkins (2000) stated that “ethnicity, or identity, doesn't always 
explain what people do (not even when they insist that it does)”. He continues to argue 
that “ethnic differences, even when combined with clear-cut differences of interests, do 
not necessarily lead to conflict” (Jenkins, 2000). The conflicts usually are much more 
complex than simply based primordial ethnic differences. As Turton argues, those who 
justify or explain these wars through pure ethnic interpretations, inevitably renders their 
arguments to the over-simplistic “ancient hatreds” narrative. This over-simplistic 
narrative ignores the (re)production of violence manifested in the tragedy of the armed 
conflict that creates and perpetuates these sentiments and salience of differences. Ethnic 
sentiment seems to be able to motivate people to act in extremely violent ways but on 
closer inspection, the empiricism of statement does not hold true. Even most recent 
examples (Yugoslavia and Rwanda) are far more complex, than simply “ancient 
hatreds.” (Turton, 1997). In fact, identity can be used to de-escalate conflicts. Using the 
leadership of bigger collective identity groups to stop the violence created by a smaller 
subsection of it.  It also can be utilized for solving issues or as guarantor for agreements 
between conflicting parties to make it acceptable to its members. Looking only at the 
negative role of ethnicities in conflicts does not reflect the entire effect that it creates. 
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3.2. When and Why People Move 
The Syrian conflict has left millions displaced and has forced many more to seek 
refuge in other states around the world. Why would people in general leave their country 
and move to places with other cultures and restart a new life where in most cases they 
will need to learn a new language, traditions, law and economical systems? The types of 
movement can be categorized, into two broad categories: voluntary and forced migration. 
Voluntary migration is defined as individual based choice and will to leave the country 
where one is located for another. The canon on this topic is very extensive. People can 
move due to many factors including those related to economic, cultural or political 
dynamics. On the other hand, forced migration is defined by externally forced 
displacement, caused by a range of factors from the emergence of armed conflict to 
deportation (Gibney, 2013). Refugee is a subcategory of forced migrants, who have been 
given official status as refugees in foreign states based on the principle states cannot 
repatriate individuals to other states where the life of the individual would be in jeopardy. 
The Syrian conflict has produced the largest number of refugees in the world. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR reports that 55% of the world’s 
refugees come from three countries with Syria producing 5.5 million of them. Figure (3) 
is from the UNHCR official website that shows the main refugees sources and hosts 
(UNHCR, 2016).  
Figure 3: Main refugees’ sources and hosts (UNHCR, 2016) 
 
It shows the UNHCR statistics about the main countries producing refugees in the world 
and the main hosting countries for those refugees. Turkey comes on top of the list of 
hosting countries with around three million. The vastness of refugee numbers, hosted in 
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Turkey is evident when compared to Pakistan, second on the list, which currently hosts 
less than half of those numbers. 
Yet it is important to ask, why would people move out of their countries against their 
will? Will Moore and Stephen Shellman in response to this question would argue it is 
violence. Their paper titled “Fear of Persecution: Forced Migration, 1952-1995” explores 
the dynamics of contemporary reality forcing individuals to leave their homes while also 
examining which states produced more refugees than others (Moore, 2004). Moore and 
Shellman mention the work of (Schmeidl, 1997) that follows the work of (Clark, 1989) 
which describes three types of factors that influence forced migration: root causes, 
proximate conditions, and intervening factors. These factors are one way to explain the 
forced migration. However, it is important to note there are other ways to describe and 
analyze the process. Moore and Shellman conclude that, “the violent behavior of 
governments and dissidents (and their interaction) are the primary determinants of forced 
migration flows” (Moore, 2004). So, the higher the degree of violence in a place the 
higher the possibility of producing refugees and hence making forced migration more 
likely to occur. With a lower level of violence conflicts should produce lower numbers 
of refugees. According to Moore and Shellman, “Institutional democracy and income do 
influence the size of forced migration flows, but their impact is relatively small: the push 
factor of violence drives the process” (Moore, 2004). Therefore, violence seems to be the 
main force behind forced migration and other factors tend to have less of an effect. If 
other economic and political issues occurred without violence, the amount of forced 
migration will be much smaller when compared to a similar situation with a violent 
factor. 
Since the end of World War II, there has been no major war between great powers 
and with time, interstate wars have decreased in favor of intrastate wars. Thus, in our 
contemporary global society civil wars within failed states are considered to be the main 
source of forced migration by many scientists. Keely describes the source of interstate 
conflict as, “fragile, failing, or failed states, not wars between states, caused this post-
Cold War displacement” (Keely, 1996). Strong and stable states do not produce refugees 
and forced migration is very unlikely to happen. Some other scientists like Wimmer and 
Schetter stated in response to the high migration flow from Afghanistan that the “main 
problem Afghanistan faces is the absence of a monopoly of power and of other basic 
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state functions” (Wimmer A and Schetter, 2003). When a state is in this situation, the 
conflict will affect the livelihoods of many that in turn causes the production of large 
numbers of refugees. The migrants that flee from their homes will seek refuge in other 
states that usually provide assistance to the incoming refugees as obligated by 
international laws.  
However, the situation on the ground can be different and in many cases the political 
leadership of some countries will advocate for banning refugees and immigrants from 
entering their borders. Jeremy Hein and Tarique Niazi describe why the states might not 
be able to provide assistance to the refugees. They argue the “state is proving less and 
less capable of assisting forced migrants due to: (1) the vast increase in the numbers of 
people displaced during a big forced migration crisis. (2) New forms of forced migration 
that do not fit existing forms of refugee protection” (Niazi & Hein , 2016). When states 
are faced with a huge wave of refugees, their institutions become incapable of handling 
the crisis and it becomes very difficult to provide the services that are usually provided 
to them. Also, when the cases do not have regulations or laws to respond to them (like 
IDPs or Stateless people) the states find it difficult to act and respond to the crisis. In 
such cases, unofficial institutions take part in the process like NGO’s, charities, and 
religious groups. The religious identity can help in responding to the refugee crisis when 
the states fall short. Hein and Naizi describes it as, “world religions remind us that the 
primordial refugees did not have a ‘nationality’ based on a ‘country of habitual 
residence’” (Niazi & Hein , 2016). When migrants from different nationalities seek 
refuge in a country with similar religion, the religious institutions would play a bigger 
role in providing them with assistance. The shared identity between the refugees and the 
host communities can help to foster improved relations between the two groups.  
 3.3. Post Conflict Environment 
After long and violent conflicts, societies go through the post conflict phase. It is 
when the society tries to overcome the atrocities that it suffered during the conflict. In 
case of failure, the conflict will break and the cycle will need to be completed to find a 
solution and stop it. Collier, Paul stated, “the post-conflict peace is typically fragile: 
around half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses” (Collier P. , 2003). This 
demonstrates how often the conflicts will reignite after the incorrect conclusion the 
tensions that produced the conflict. There are many difficulties that post conflict societies 
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go through. Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom in their paper Post-
Conflict Risks, identify two main challenges, “Post-conflict societies face two distinctive 
challenges: economic recovery and reduction of the risk of a recurring conflict” (Collier 
P. A., 2008). Overcoming those challenges is necessary to overcome and maintain 
stability after the conflict. Collier’s paper reaches the conclusion that, “political solutions 
need to be supplemented by robust economic and military external assistance” (Collier 
P. A., 2008). The economic development will take a long time to be effective. Therefore, 
they recommend military assistance to maintain the peace while the economic progress 
occurs.  
Krause and Oliver in their paper on Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict 
Environments examines the post-conflict peace building (PCPB). They state that “most 
recent post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation programs have been conducted in 
an ad hoc and unsystematic way, with little critical self-reflection on the underlying 
assumptions or structural biases of PCPB efforts” (Krause, 2005). They consider that the 
process is usually conducted as a temporary response with an assumption that it will 
accelerate the reconstruction of the state. However, this is not always the case. Looking 
at the track record of the PCPB operations they state that, “the track record of PCPB is 
littered with states (Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Haiti and even Cambodia) in 
which domestic governance is weak, armed violence remains high, and respect for human 
rights and the rule of law is questionable” (Krause, 2005). The process is not that simple 
or successful as it is expected. More planning and considerations needs to be accounted 
for to promote more successful state building endeavors. Another study by Joakim 
Kreutz concluded that in armed conflicts, “if the belligerents mobilized along ethnic 
lines, the risk of recurrence increases” (Joakim, 2010). This is especially the case when 
the conflict duration is longer. This should be taken into consideration when working 
with the Syrian conflict as the long duration and the existence of multiple ethnicities and 
identities where the conflict is affecting their bonds has severely damaged their 
coexistence.  
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3.4.  Previous Work on the Syrian Conflict: 
The Syrian conflict is still very recent and violent and not much work has been 
conducted about it. It is difficult to obtain accurate data from inside Syria. While the 
work on the Syrians who fled from Syria is still very small and mostly practical research 
conducted to design the response to the aid and relief projects and the refugee wave. Most 
focus goes to the armed and violent aspects of the conflict and how the progress of the 
armed parties on the ground and how the terrorist attacks are being handled. Very little 
has been done on the analysis of the conflict and the implications of the problem. A report 
on the Washington Post about the Syrian refugee crisis states that “the increasing influx 
of refugees and asylum-seekers to Europe is signaling to the West that the Syrian conflict 
can no longer be neglected without consequences” (Mironova, Alhamad, & Whitt, 2015). 
Handling the Syrian refugees is not a temporary action and with the conflict’s progress 
without the sight of a solution also means that more will be coming. Some countries 
hosted more refugees than others. This also brought another issue into the front. Icduygu 
describes it as “the Syrian refugee crisis demonstrates the limitations of today’s 
international asylum and protection system, and presents an opportunity for the 
international community to put the concept of “”burden sharing” into practice” (Icduygu, 
2015). As we can see, there are many implications emerging from the Syrian conflict and 
more work needs to be done to understand its extent.  
Most of the work that has been done so far was on the Syrians who left Syria, the reasons 
they left their country and migrated. The Washington Post’s report states that “More than 
half (57 percent) of ordinary civilians say that they left because it is simply too dangerous 
to stay; 41 percent say this is also the main reason they left” (Mironova, Alhamad, & 
Whitt, 2015). Those publications provide an insight about the Syrians’ point of view 
about the conflict. However, the Syrians inside Syria are not being communicated and 
very small amount of work is targeting them. The dangerous situation makes it extremely 
difficult to collect information from the inside of Syria.  
The work conducted inside Syria is very difficult and there are some publications 
that present an analysis to some aspects of the conflict. The researches conducted by 
Badael Foundation such as Peace Building Defines Our Future Now research provide 
some insight about women’s role, and basically gender identity, in the peace building 
process inside Syria (Ghazzawi, Mohammad, & Ramadan, 2015). While Peace 
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Journalism or War Journalism research sheds light on the role of local media groups in 
supporting peace or advocating for violence (Alhuseen, Abyad, Alwany, & Sabbagh, 
2016). The CCSD also conducted some research inside Syria. The report titled Building 
peace within Syrian communities describes the work of the community leaders at the 
forefront of efforts to build peace in Syria, and the mechanisms that they use (CCSD, 
Building peace within Syrian communities, 2014). It also published a report about 
Perspectives of Key Syrian actors on “Freeze Zones” Initiative (CCSD, Perspectives of 
Key Syrian actors on “Freeze Zones” Initiative, 2015). Another report was published 
about the public accountability inside Syria and how the communities are holding their 
decision makers accountable for their actions (CCSD, Public Accountability in Syria, 
2016).  Also, The Day After Foundation TDA published a report about the perception of 
Syrian citizens inside Syria about the international initiatives (TDA, 2016 ). Another 
report by TDA describes how Syrians perceive sectarianism in Syria. (The Day After, 
2016). Figure (5) shows the responses of the participants in TDA’s survey about the how 
they perceive other identities in Syria.  
Other survey conducted by TDA shows that respondents in both regime and 
opposition-held areas are united in their rejection of federalism. 44% in opposition-held 
areas reject it and 57% in regime-held areas. While 79.6% of respondents in Self-
Administration areas endorse federalism, more than half strongly support it. (The Day 
After T. , 2016).  These researches are important and provides an insight about Syrian 
people’s perspectives from inside Syria. However, it looks at the opinions of people in 
different locations without looking at their background and identity. The regime and 
opposition areas are mostly Arabic majority, while the Self-Administration area are 
mostly Kurdish majority. Was it the identity of the participant the factor that created this 
difference? Or was it the experience itself in those areas? It is hard to tell the cause and 
effect through observations only and without further analysis.  
In this thesis the link between the identity and the attitude towards an initiative is 
what has been examined. The analysis attempts to link the pieces together to understand 
how they interact and affect each other. Not only the attitude, but also the migration and 
post conflict preferences are analyzed. It also tries to measure the participants’ attitudes 
indirectly through a survey experiment. The survey experiment used in this survey aimed 
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to eliminate many factors that might affect the responses and obtain more accurate 
information. The logic behind using the survey experiment is discussed next.  
3.5. Theory behind the Survey Experiment: 
There are two main methods for research that include observational and experimental 
researches. Each of them has their strengths and weaknesses. The main goal of survey 
experiments is “combining the best aspects of both approaches, capitalizing on their 
strengths and eliminating many of their weaknesses” (Mutz, 2011). A survey experiment 
can be described as “to modify one thing in a situation and then compare an outcome to 
what existed without the modification” (Neuman, 2002). It has many useful ways to be 
utilized. Mostly it is used to determine the cause and effect relationship between tow 
variables. “An experiment can powerfully test and focus evidence about causal 
relationships” (Neuman, 2002). The experiment used here is an empirical one. “In the 
empirically based experiment, our goal is to determine whether an independent variable 
has a significant effect on a specific dependent variable” (Neuman, 2002). In this 
experiment both the control and treatment group are almost identical and the only factor 
that is changed is the treatment.  
Most of the challenges that can be overcome through a survey experiment are 
described as “challenges include selection bias, spurious correlation, correlated 
measurement errors, censored data, the lack of true counterfactuals, and mutual 
causation” (Kuklinski, Gaines, & Quirk, 2006). There have been many researches that 
utilized a survey experiment. Regarding ethnicity and identity there was an experiment 
about the effect of race on hiring staff (Michael & Mullainathan. , 2004). The experiment 
attempted to identify the relationship between the race of a person and the chance of 
getting a job. The experiment is used here in a similar logic as it tries to determine the 
effect of the identity on Syrian people’s preferences about the conflict and its end. 
The different international initiatives towards a solution for the Syrian conflict faced 
different responses from Syrian citizens. Some would support a certain initiative while 
they would oppose another. The reasons behind this attitude towards those initiatives can 
vary. Many factors are claimed to affect it including political, economic, or other factors. 
The main hypothesis here is that when a certain initiative is presented, it is more likely 
to be accepted when supported by an international party. The stronger and more support 
an initiative will receive from international parties, the more likely it will be supported 
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by the Syrian citizens. Also, it is claimed that the identity has a significant effect over the 
attitude towards an initiative. When an initiative is presented or supported by a party that 
is considered an ally or has a shared interests with an identity, it will be more likely that 
the initiative will be supported more by the members of this identity. It will also be 
rejected by the members of other identities that are in conflict with the accepting identity 
even if the initiative had no conflict with their interests. The experiment in this thesis 
examines this claim. The Arabic and Kurdish ethnic identities in Syria are considered by 
many to have a conflict of interests. When an initiative is presented by a party that allies 
more with the Kurds, the Arabs can become suspicious and more likely to reject the 
initiative in fear that the Kurds will obtain their interests on the account of theirs.  
For this experiment, the US government was chosen as a treatment to support an 
initiative presented by the UN. The UN is supposed to be a neutral party so its effect on 
the attitude should be minimum. The US government was chosen as a treatment because 
of its strength as an enforcing power over the initiative which is considered to provide a 
guarantee in case of violations. It also has a more opposing attitude towards the regime 
which can be more acceptable by the Kurds and the Arabs in the rebels’ areas than Russia 
which supports the Assad regime strongly. Another factor is that it has less conflict of 
interests or involvement in the conflict than the local parties like Turkey or Iran. It also 
supports the Kurds in their war against terrorism while it its support to most Arabic has 
been degrading and its promises of supporting them in many occasions has not been 
fulfilled which created distrust and suspicion. This was enforced by the strong support to 
the Kurdish forces in Northern-Syria which was considered by many Arabic leaders to 
be a threat to the Arabic existence in the area. This is why The US’s role is expected to 
affect only the ethnic identity aspect with the respondents so we can expect to get a more 
accurate results by having the US as a treatment. 
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4. Research Design 
 4.1. Methodology 
The main question that this research asks is:  
“How does a person’s identity affect the way they see a solution for the Syrian War?  
To explore this question, this thesis communicates with Syrian citizens and look at two 
different identities inside Syria; the Arabs and the Kurds. It examines how each identity 
is responding to three main aspects of the conflict; the end of the war, migration, and the 
post war environment.  
For the first aspect, this research is an action research that conducted a survey 
endorsement experiment in Syria by presenting Syrian participants with hypothetical 
peace initiative. Half the participants read a version of the text that included a note of 
endorsement by an outside international party that affects both ethnicities. The 
endorsement was by adding that The US government declared that it supports this 
solution as it will end the conflict and provide stability to the area. The other half of the 
participants read a version without this endorsement note. Then all respondents stated 
their level of support for the hypothetical initiative. The difference in responses between 
the two groups of participants represents the effect of the endorsement on their attitudes. 
The crucial difference between a regular survey and a survey experiment is that in the 
latter we do not directly ask a participant’s attitude or opinion on a given topic. Instead 
we present participants with a number of hypothetical scenarios in which a participant’s 
choices reveal their underlying attitude. Survey experiments are particularly useful if 
participants are likely to give false answers to direct questions because of social 
desirability bias, that is to say, they want to give answers that the researcher will approve. 
We are primarily interested in whether a person’s support for a peace initiative depends 
on the endorsement the chosen party and how each identity responds to it. The survey 
also included some questions about a person’s characteristics that may affect their 
attitudes towards the initiative. These factors include the person’s political background 
or affiliation with political parties, educational background, involvement in the conflict 
(did they lose a close relative, a house or property), and where the person lives. 
In addition to this endorsement experiment the survey included questions about 
migration, which is one of the main effects of the Syrian conflict on other countries.  The 
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participants were asked why they have not migrated so far and if they plan to do so in the 
future. We are particularly interested in whether people who remain in Syria have reasons 
to stay or lack resources to leave. The last point of the survey was to ask the Syrian people 
on how they see the future of the conflict. What is their expected view of the solution 
and how the post conflict environment will be in their view and what kind of support 
they expect will be needed in order to rebuild the country.  
The data was mainly analyzed through statistical methods. The analysis with statistical 
methods will explore how the answers to each question can be connected to the identity 
or other characteristics of the participants. The survey included some open-ended 
questions. Those questions will explain some of the respondents’ responses and it will 
help in explaining any connections that are found using statistical analysis, or it will 
provide some information that cannot be obtained using statistical methods. 
4.2. Data Collection 
The data was collected by contacting Syrian citizens living inside Syria. The 
participants were sent a survey which contained the questions that were designed to get 
the needed information to analyze the research topic. The survey was designed into two 
forms; one included the control question and one included the treatment. The forms were 
implemented on an online survey platform4. Each respondent was sent a link to one of 
the forms to fill. The targeted area included all the Syrians residing inside Syria 
regardless of the exact location of their residence. However, due to the data collection 
limitations mentioned below, most respondents were from the northern part of Syria. 
Given that Syria is a conflict zone we were not be able to use probabilistic sampling 
methods. Instead we used the snowball sampling method. We contacted several people 
inside Syria in different geographical locations. These people answered the survey and 
they contacted other people inside Syria to fill the questionnaire. The process was done 
based on personal connections and no professional surveyors were involved. The first 
participants were contacted online first and informed about the project. They were asked 
for their participation and to fill the consent form. The consent form is available in the 
appendix. Then they did the same process when asking other participants inside Syria to 
participate in the survey by explaining the project and asking them for their participation 
                                                 
4 The platform that was used here is google forms which can be accessed from the link: 
https://docs.google.com/forms/u/0/ 
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and filling the consent form. After signing the consent form the participants answered 
the questions. An Institutional Review Board form (IRB form) was prepared and 
approved by Sabancı University Research Ethics Council (SUREC) before the data 
collection was initialized. 
Any Syrian citizen could participate in the survey as long as they are residing inside Syria 
at the time of the data collection. The only restriction was that the participant should be 
from either an Arab or a Kurdish ethnicity. Gender, education, occupation balance was 
taken into consideration and attempted to be achieved but it was not a requirement for 
participation. The participant’s identity was not known before they filled the survey. 
They would check a box in the survey to identify as Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, or other. 
The only known information before filling the survey was if the participant will be given 
a treatment or control form. It was distributed to create a balance between the size of the 
treatment and control groups included in the survey. 
4.3. Measures 
In order to avoid obstacles and obtains as accurate information as possible while 
protecting the participants from suffering any harm due to their participation in the 
survey, the following measures were used: 
1- The first step after creating the survey instrument was to pre-test it in order to 
ensure that questions are not ambiguous and do not create discomfort for the 
participants. The survey was sent to 10 Syrian citizens for test before the data 
collection was initialized. The pre-test responses were not included in the final 
data set. 
2- The participants were given a consent form in in the beginning of the survey. The 
participant could not complete the survey without approving the form. The form 
was written in Arabic and if they had any questions the researcher and the thesis 
advisor’s contacts were included for them to communicate with. In order to 
continue with the survey, the participants needed to mark the box in the form that 
says “I participate in this survey voluntarily and understand that I can stop at any 
point I choose. I consent to my answers being used for research purposes”.  
3- The survey did not ask for any direct identifiers such as a participant’s name, ID 
number, telephone number or address. It only collected information about 
participants’ age, gender, education level, occupation, the area they are originally 
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from and the area where they live currently. Since it did not record participants’ 
names or other identifying information an individual’s answers will not be 
traceable to them. 
4- In order to minimize discomfort, the experimental scenarios were designed to be 
hypothetical. Participants were explicitly informed that all scenarios they read in 
the survey are hypothetical. 
5- All responses obtained from participants are confidential and only accessed by 
the researcher and the thesis advisor, who is the PI in this project. Responses are 
analyzed and used only for research purposes.  
6- We do not predict any harm to the participants from the survey. The survey was 
conducted through online connections so no one was asked to go in or out of the 
country. They were informed that all the scenarios in the experiment are 
hypothetical, which minimized the risk of misleading people about the political 
situation, and if a respondent felt uncomfortable with any item during data 
collection, they were free to quit the study.  
4.4. Limitations: 
The main limitation of this study is the fact that the participants were contacted 
through personal connections of the researcher which resulted in several shortcomings 
including; first, a small sample that could be more accurate if it was larger. Second, the 
sample was not fully randomized. Some characteristics of the sample, such as education, 
was greater than the others. Finally, the sample was geographically distributed mostly in 
the northern part of Syria and did not include all the locations inside it. 
Another limitation was that the participants were not contacted directly. The 
communication through online survey made many participants refrain from participating 
as they were afraid that the information would go to untrusted parties. In fact, between 
200 to 300 more participants were contacted and refused to participate in the survey. If 
the communication was direct with the participants, the sample would be almost three to 
four times as big.  
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5. Descriptive Statistics 
The participants in the survey were all Syrians living inside Syria at the time of 
collecting the data. Most participants lived in the northern part of Syria in the region 
outside the control of the regime. Most of the Arabic participants lived in the northeastern 
part while most of the Kurdish participants lived in the north-western part with some 
interlocution between them. Figure (4) shows the percentage and number of participants 
from each geographical location inside Syria with two participants who did not specify 
their location exactly.  
Figure 4: Sample Geographic Distribution 
 
The reason behind this distribution is basically the accessibility and the ability to reach 
the participants in those areas. Despite the questionnaire being online which makes it 
accessible by all regions, the people are usually afraid of participating without a direct 
contact to the party conducting the research to make sure that there is no hidden agenda 
behind it. Most of the connections were located in the northern part of Syria. Also, in the 
regime’s areas it is even harder to participate in surveys because intelligence is 
monitoring the internet activities and anyone with suspicious activities will face severe 
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consequences which keeps people from participating in surveys especially if they are, 
even slightly, related to political issues. 
Most participants were between the ages of 25 to 35 years old. Figure (5) shows the age 
distribution of the participants. While figure (6) displays the gender distribution of the 
participants. Less than third of the participants were females while the remaining ones 
were males. 
Figure 5: Sample age distribution 
 
Figure 6: Sample gender distribution 
 
The education background of the participants shows that most of them held bachelor’s 
degree or was studying in university for one. The percentage of participants with a 
university degree or higher is over 80% while the participants with only high school or 
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short-cycle tertiary education were less than 10% each. Figure (7) shows the educational 
background of the participants. 
Figure 7: Education background 
 
It is worth noting that this distribution could have been affected by multiple factors.  One 
of the notable factors is the fact that personal connections played a role in encouraging 
the people to participate in the survey. As mentioned earlier, people needed a direct 
contact to the researching party to participate in the survey. Because most of the 
connections were male, around the age of 30 and with university degrees. This helped in 
getting a sample that had similar characteristics to them. Another factor is the internet 
accessibility. Due to difficult access to internet and security risks inside Syria, many users 
with lower education only uses internet for communications and social media and don’t 
use anything else. Only more educated people use the internet and participate in online 
surveys. 
It was taken into consideration that the control and treatment groups should have similar 
characteristics. When comparing the control group to the treatment group, we can see 
that this is true. The appendix contains t-tests comparing the control to the treatment 
group. The groups contain close percentages of women, people who lost a person or faced 
financial loss, the percentage of Arabs and Kurds, and similar age distribution.  
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6. Findings 
 6.1. The End of the War 
When asked about how the war will end, the responses show clearly that the 
participants see the political solution as more likely to be the solution. However, the 
participants seemed to be more confident that the war will not end in a total victory for 
one of the parties than about it being ended with a political solution. Almost 80% of them 
considered that to be unlikely with 57% considering it to be very unlikely and 22% to be 
somewhat likely. When they were asked about ending the war with a political solution, 
the majority of 68% considered it to be likely with 33% considering it to very likely and 
35% to be somewhat likely. These numbers reflect that the participants in this survey 
have lost most hope in having one of the conflicted parties winning over the remaining 
ones even if it was the party that they support or wish it to win. They are looking at a 
political solution as being more likely to end the war but they are still not as sure about 
it. Figure (8) below shows the percentage of responses to this question. 
Figure 8: How the war will end 
 
The hesitation about the political solution can be due to division in the international 
world. Most the parties on the ground in Syria survive with the support of international 
actors with each pushing towards its own interests. The international supporters are still 
divided and each of them pushing its allies against the others. The Security Council was 
not able to take a decisive act about the Syrian war despite the amount of human rights 
violations committed by the conflicting parties especially the Assad regime which even 
used chemical weapons against civilian areas with the only response is to remove these 
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weapons without any consequences. With the support of Russia and China and the use 
of veto against any decisions that affect the Assad regime, the Security Council was 
unable to take any effective actions to at least limit the violence inside Syria and it 
continues to escalate as the time progress. This is also lowering the expectations of one 
of the parties winning the war as it continues for its sixth year with no party taking over 
the other ones. Most of the participants also expressed the expectation that war will not 
be ending anytime soon, and more than half the participants thought it will last more than 
five years.  
It is worth noting that the responses for both questions about how the war will end or its 
duration showed no statistical relationship between the results and the respondent’s 
identity as Kurdish or Arabic. This is expected to reflect similar views from both 
identities to these questions. 
The Survey Experiment 
To test the effect of the identity on a respondent’s reaction to a scenario about 
ending the conflict. The survey included a question about how the respondent feels about 
a hypothetical initiative from the United Nations for a proposed solution. To create a 
survey experiment, half the participants received a version of the initiative without any 
endorsement. While the other half received the initiative with an added endorsement by 
the US government. The initiative’s description was short and it included several points 
that were of interest to both the Arabs and the Kurds. The initiative’s description in the 
survey was as follows: 
Now I will read you a hypothetical solution to the war. 
The United Nations is trying to get the factions in Syria to start negotiations to reach a 
settlement. 
 The negotiations will have 3 main goals: 
1- Maintaining a unified Syrian state. 
2- Overtaking terrorist groups and removing foreign fighters in Syria. 
3- Guarantee the rights of all minorities and protecting them. 
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This is the description presented to the control group. While for the treatment group, the 
following text was added at the end of the description: 
The US government declared that it supports this solution as it will end the conflict and 
provide stability to the area.  
The support of an international super power can add more trust to the implementation 
of the initiative and the endorsement can mean that there is more guarantee that the 
parties will commit more to its conditions. However, the US government had an 
unstable position towards the parties related to the different identities. It supports the 
PYD which is the Syrian branch of the PKK in Turkey which the US government 
condemns. It also promised the support of some parts of the Syrian opposition but it 
only supported some parts and abstained from supporting others. This might cause 
more distrust towards the US government by the Syrian Arabs than the Syrian Kurds 
and the experiment was designed to see if that holds true. 
The Figure (9) below shows the responses to this initiative by the control and treatment 
groups. While Figure (10) shows the attitude towards the initiative by ethnicity (Arabs 
and Kurds). 
Figure 9: The attitude towards the initiative by treatment 
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Figure 10: The attitude towards the initiative by ethnicity 
 
Surprisingly, the statistical analysis of the responses shows no relationship 
between the treatment and the respondent’s attitude towards the initiative. The treatment 
had no effect over supporting or opposing the initiative. It only shows a relationship 
between the respondent’s identity as Arab or Kurdish and their attitude towards the 
initiative. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in the appendix. The analysis 
included the effect of treatment on the Arabs and the Kurds. It also controlled for the 
effects of other variables like gender, education, age, losing someone, and financial loss. 
It all showed no relationship between the treatment and the attitude. 
The lack of relationship between the treatment and the responses can be simply explained 
by concluding that the relationship between the treatment and the respondent’s attitude 
towards the initiative is negligible. However, it can also be a result of other factors that 
affected the appearance of such relationship. Some of these factors include the following: 
The treatment was too subtle: the treatment used in this experiment used the US 
government as the party that provides the endorsement. The US government provides 
support to both parties of the Arabic opposition and the Kurdish leadership. It also 
included a statement from the government that it was a good initiative. It is possible that 
if the statement included a commitment to enforce it and an obligation to participate it 
would have been more effective. This might cause the responses to be unchanged by the 
endorsement.   
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The treatment was added to the end of the description: the survey was a short online 
survey that can be read quickly. The text for the initiative was long and the participants 
might skim through it quickly without fully reading it. As the endorsement being located 
at the end of the text it can be ignored or passed by without fully being read. If it was at 
the beginning of the text it might have resulted in a bigger effect. 
The sample was too small: the sample here is small and when used in an experiment it 
gets divided into a control and treatment group which reduces its size more. This might 
cause the effects of the experiment to be unnoticeable and it needs a larger sample to be 
investigated. 
What is noticeable in the results is the relationship between the ethnicity of the 
respondent and their attitude towards the initiative. The small P value in the regression 
indicates that the effect of the ethnicity cannot be ignored. When looking at the plot we 
can see how this relationship can be described. Despite having a smaller sample, the 
number of Kurds supporting the initiative is very close to the number of Arabic 
supporters who had a larger sample. There are also 16 Arabic participants who opposed 
the initiative with zero Kurdish ones. This means that none of the Kurdish participants 
found any problem in the initiative to be unacceptable for them. With the Arabic ones, 
there was a significant amount that did find a problem and rejected the initiative. 
The Kurds are accused by some parties of planning to divide Syria for creating their own 
nation. The first point in the initiative was to maintain a unified Syrian state while the 
third one was to guarantee the rights of all minorities and protecting them. The Kurdish 
participants accepted the initiative which reflects the acceptance of maintaining a unified 
Syria as long as it guaranties the rights of the minorities in contrast to the accusations. 
These points are also usually accepted by the Arabs. The second point in the initiative 
about overtaking terrorist groups and removing foreign fighters in Syria can be the 
problematic one for the Arabs and it is most likely the one that caused the rejection of 
the initiative. The Kurdish area has more organized armed groups that fight with the 
support of international actors against ISIS. The accusations of terrorism are only 
directed towards them by individual parties like Turkey but not by the international 
community. In fact, the Kurdish forces are playing a role as a party on the ground inside 
Syria that is opposing terrorism. This makes this point more likely to be acceptable for 
the Kurdish participants as it does not pose any threats for them. On the Arabic side, this 
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is a different matter. In the opposition controlled Arabic majority areas there is a big 
number of unorganized armed groups that fight with the support of different parties. The 
Assad regime accused the opposition by being terrorists since the revolution began and 
it always demands the elimination of terrorist groups before discussing any solution for 
the crisis. This is considered by the opposition to be the elimination of the opposition so 
that the regime can regain control and destroy all other parties.  The opposition usually 
agrees on eliminating terrorism and it is fighting against many terrorist groups in Syria 
including ISIS. However, they demand a clear definition of who are the terrorist groups 
that will be targeted by such agreements for them to make sure that such decisions will 
not be used against them by the regime and its allies. This is most likely the reason for 
the Arabic opposition to the initiative. 
As the experiment’s main part about the initiative was presented by the UN, the survey 
included a question about how the participant perceives the role of the UN in the Syrian 
conflict. The responses are presented in the figure (11).  
Figure 11: UN's role 
 
The statistical analysis indicates a considerable relationship between the ethnicity of the 
respondent as an Arab or a Kurd and their attitude towards the initiative. The regression 
results are available in the appendix. Mainly the Arabic participants were divided into 
two groups; the first and bigger group which makes more than half the participants 
considered the UN’s role to support the Assad regime. Since the survey was conducted 
in opposition controlled area, this is considered a sign of distrust and the UN’s role is 
considered to support the suffering of the Syrian people. The second group with less than 
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half the participants considered the UN to have no effect on the Syrian conflict. Very 
small and negligible number of participants considered the UN’s role to be impartial. 
With the Kurdish participants, there was a different response. The majority of the 
participants with more than half of the sample considered the role of the UN to have no 
effect on the conflict. Only 14% of the Kurdish participants considered the UN’s role to 
support the Assad regime which is a much lower percentage than the Arabs.  
It can be noted here that the identity has an effect on the way Syrian participants in this 
survey perceive an initiative. The Arabic participants had some doubt about the initiative 
and some of them rejected it. While more of them expressed distrust in the UN’s role in 
the conflict and considered it as supporting the Assad regime. The Kurdish participants 
were more accepting and none of them rejected the initiative. Also, less of them 
expressed distrust in the UN’s role. Some of them still did but much less than the Arabic 
ones. It seems here that the Arabic identity of the participants was threatened by the 
initiative presented by the UN which caused the rejection, while the Kurdish identity was 
less threatened and they had no rejection to the initiative. However, in both cases a high 
number of the participants, almost half of them, thought that the UN had no effect at all. 
Participants’ Recommendations 
In order to give the participants a space to explain some of their ideas, open-ended 
questions were included in the survey to ask the participants about the challenges that are 
facing the end of the war in their opinions and what they would recommend putting an 
end to it. Most the Arabic participants stated that they see the main challenge facing the 
war is that the Assad regime is still in power. Subsequently, many of them recommended 
the removal of the Assad regime in order to put an end to the war. This was explained in 
several ways; some considered the regime to be a criminal authority that is killing the 
Syrian people and it will not stop until removed. This means that the war will not stop 
until this party is removed from the equation. Others considered the regime as a tool for 
a Russian-Iranian occupation to Syria. The regime is the front for those outside forces to 
control the country and this tool needs to be removed and the occupation forces to leave 
so the country can be governed by Syrians and start the peace building process. Some 
considered the stubbornness of the regime with no concessions at all during the entire 
conflict to be one of the main reasons behind the violence and the continuation of the 
war. The regime does not recognize any opposing party and considers them all to be 
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terrorists that should be annihilated. This is reflected in other statements by some 
participants who considered terrorism to be a strong reason behind the war and it should 
be removed from the country starting with the regime and its supporting militias as the 
main terrorist groups inside Syria. Some of the Kurdish participants gave similar 
statements about the need to remove the regime for a solution to the war. However, it 
was in lower frequency than in the Arabic participants’ responses. This could be because 
many participants in the Kurdish area feared the consequences of such statements by the 
regime since it still exists in their areas.  
Another issue that can be seen in the comments is the role of the international community 
and other countries. Many participants considered the role of outside forces and the fight 
over their interests in Syria by supporting different parties as the gas that fuels the war. 
Iran and Russia were mentioned most repeatedly but other forces including the US and 
Arabic countries were also within the comments. The participants considered the lack of 
agreement within the international community, the weak role of the UN, and following 
private interest on the account of the Syrian population and the stability in the area as the 
reason behind sustaining the war. This was reflected in the responses of both the Arabic 
and the Kurdish participants. 
The main tool that the participants from both ethnicities mentioned the most was the 
dialog and negotiations between the conflicted parties to reach a peaceful solution and 
end the war. No major difference in the challenges that face a solution for the conflict or 
the methods that should be used to reach such solution was detected in the responses of 
the participants. Both the challenges and the recommendations given by the Arabic and 
the Kurds were similar and the different identities were on the same page in this regard. 
6.2. Migration 
The survey included participants that were all inside Syria. Despite the challenges 
and threats faced within Syria and the safety that can be obtained by taking refuge in 
other countries, the participants did not leave Syria. The survey included a question about 
the reason the participants did not leave the country. Whether they wanted to leave but 
they were not able to do so, or they had the means to relocate but did not want to. Most 
of the respondents with more than 82% said that they could leave and travel somewhere 
else, but they did not want to. Only 17% of the participants said that they wanted but did 
not have the ability to do so.  
39 
 
As the Syrian crisis goes through its sixth year, most people who wanted to leave 
were able to find the means to do so in the previous years. This explains the majority of 
the respondents who wanted to stay in the country. Figure (12) shows the percentages of 
the responses on this question. 
Figure 12: the ability to leave Syria 
 
When examining the responses of the Arabic respondents and the Kurdish ones 
separately, no difference between the answers of both groups were detected. Very close 
percentages exist among the Arabs and the Kurds in response to the ability to leave Syria 
or staying inside it. Most participants from both ethnicities stated that their presence 
inside Syria is a choice made mainly because of their commitment to their home country 
and they do not want to leave to another place despite having the opportunity and the 
means to do so. Some expressed the responsibility to be a part of the change that is 
happening in Syria and it is their duty to take action and participate in reaching the best 
solution for their home country. Others considered living inside their home country and 
within their people and culture is the best option for them. The participants who were not 
able to leave despite their need to do so mostly considered the risks and financial costs 
to be over their capacity and they will leave if they had the ability. The need for leaving 
comes mostly from the risks of the armed conflict and the potential threat of an attack or 
a bombing that endangers their lives and their families’ lives as well. One of the major 
reasons that pushes young men towards leaving is the obligatory military service that the 
regime enforces on any man between the age of 18 and 42. This will get those men into 
the frontlines of battlefronts with no deadline for being relieved form that service unless 
having a permanent injury, a disability or death. Many men have been the army for years 
with no idea when they will be released. In the non-regime areas, some armed groups 
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also started to enforce such regulations. The Kurdish armed forces began to recruit men 
living in the areas under its control to participate in its forces. This has extended the 
pressure on the young men to leave Syria despite having the ability to stay there with no 
immediate threat. 
The issue of the mandatory service is an indication that the armed groups are starting to 
get more organized and they are starting to act as functioning institutions that enforces 
obligations on the citizens. 
The participants were presented with another question about their expectations of where 
to be in five years. Figure (13) shows the percentages of the responses. 
Figure 13: where do you expect to be in five years. 
 
The results about staying inside Syria are similar to the previous question with no major 
effect of ethnicity over the responses. However, we can spot some difference in the 
responses of the Arabic participants and the Kurdish ones. As the percentage of the 
respondents who see themselves out of Syria are similar between both ethnicities. It is 
noticed that 25% more Kurdish participants expect to be in the same place after five 
years. While 29% Arabic participants expected to be in another city inside Syria. This is 
expected to be a result of the fact that the Arabic areas included in the survey has suffered 
more from the war than the Kurdish ones. More Arabic participants were IDPs than the 
Kurds. The IDPs has less connection to the cities where they are living currently and they 
hope to return to their home cities after the war. The expectation or “hope” of returning 
there after five years can be related to their hope of the war’s end and the ability to return 
to their hometowns by then. The Kurdish participants were mostly living in their home 
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towns and this is the reason that less of them expect to be in another city inside Syria 
after five years.   
It is worth noting that Turkey is the main host for the Syrian refugees in the world. More 
than three million Syrian refugees are living in Turkey currently. There are several 
factors that affect the reason behind the big popularity of Turkey with the Syrian refugees 
including its location, capacity, economic and accessibility. But it should be noted that 
the shared identity in religion, history and ethnicity for some Kurds, Turkman and Arabs 
can play a big role in this case. However, it is out of the range of this research to discuss 
this issue. 
6.3. Post War 
The survey aimed to get some information about how much the participants were 
affected by the war. It included two questions about this subject; the first is about losing 
a close friend or family member, the second is about the financial losses that the 
participants have faced. The results show that more than 92% of participants did lose a 
close friend or a family member. Only less than 8% of the participants did not face such 
loss. When comparing the results according to ethnicity, we find close results between 
the Arabs and the Kurds. Only 5% difference between the two identities. Also, the 
regression results show no relationship between the two variables. 
This is different when looking at the financial loss that the participants faced. In total, 
less than 24% of the participants said they did not face any financial loss because of the 
war, while the remaining participants faced at least one other loss from a house, a car, a 
job, a land, or savings. One added category by the some of the participants in the 
comments was losing their study. Many college students were unable to continue their 
education because of the war. The main reasons they cannot attend their universities 
anymore include the universities’ existence in a dangerous or inaccessible regions, or it 
is under the control of a party were the student opposes and will be at risk if they attend. 
Losing education cannot be included in the analysis as many participants might have 
faced a similar loss but since it was not included in the options they did not mention it. 
The main options included in the question are direct losses. Other indirect losses include 
the currency exchange rate that dropped more than 10 times its value before 2011 with 
the salaries increasing in a much lower scale. The average salary of government sector 
42 
 
employee dropped from around 350 USD before 2011 to around 75 USD in 2017. The 
indirect losses are not included in the survey as they are very difficult to measure. 
When looking at the financial losses based on ethnicity, we can see a difference in the 
responses between Arabic and Kurdish participants. The results show more losses for the 
Arabic participants than the Kurdish. Around 40% of the Kurdish participants expressed 
that they did not face any financial loss compared to only 11% from the Arabic. When 
examining the relationship statistically, we find through a regression with the Arabic 
indicator variable as the dependent variable and the types of losses as the independent 
variables that the R-squared value is large enough to prove a relationship between the 
ethnicity of the participant and the chance of facing a financial loss. The P values show 
that the Arabs are more likely expected to lose a house or a land than the Kurds. The 
appendix shows the results of the regression. This is more likely, as mentioned earlier, 
due to the fact that the Kurdish areas did not suffer as much as the Arabic majority areas 
included in the survey. The Arabic majority areas suffered from direct shelling and 
targeted by airstrikes. Many areas also became frontlines in the battles between different 
factions including the regime, rebel forces, and ISIS. In the meantime, most Kurdish 
areas were involved in much lower scale in the armed conflict. Figure (14) shows the 
distribution of financial losses based on ethnicity. 
Figure 14:  Financial loss based on ethnicity 
 
Those are only the direct financial losses that the participants have endured. Indirect 
losses like currency exchange rates compared to salaries,  
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a lump sum payment equal to 6 months’ minimum wages or a 3-month training program 
that will give you skills that aims to help them find employment? The figure (15) below 
shows the responses of the participants. 
Figure 15: Support preference 
 
With a deeper analysis, it is worth noting that statistically there is no effect of the 
ethnicity on the preference. Both the Kurdish and Arabic participants had similar 
preference in regard to the financial or training support. The appendix shows the 
regression results for this question. Despite the different losses faced by each ethnicity, 
the preference between training and funding after the end of the war is the same.  
It is worth noting that this question was the most question that the participants did not 
want to provide a respond to it. Almost third of them marked the option “Don’t want to 
respond”. There is no clear reason for this abstention. It can be simple shyness or other 
reason that was not reflected by the responses or comments.  
So we can conclude that despite the different effect of the war on the Arabs and the 
Kurds, the participants had a similar response to what they prefer after the war, and the 
identity did not have an effect over their preference. Identity does not play any role on 
the individual expectations of the post conflict period in this survey.  
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7. Conclusion and Implications 
This research has explored one of the world’s most complicated conflicts directly as 
it occurs, by communicating with Syrians, on the ground, inside Syria. This is important 
dimension of this research, as it does not depend on expectations, media sources or any 
mediator between the information source and the analysis. It also provides information 
about the conflict as it progresses on the ground and not after its end. This can provide 
information and recommendations on how to positively develop the conflict and how the 
different Syrian identities can react to international initiatives. The data-collection 
methods were designed and implemented to fit the research objectives and provide 
accurate reflection of the participants’ views about the topic. The survey had a pilot test 
to make sure the questions were clear and that the respondents could fully understand 
what they were responding to and that the information provided is dependable. It is still 
not perfect and has its limitations with the distribution and randomization of the 
participants. Despite the sample being small, the data collected is robust and very rare to 
obtain under similar circumstances.  
When looking at the answer to the research question, the main interesting point to 
note is that the identity of the participants did affect some aspects of their attitude with 
different reactions while it had no effect on other aspects and both identities had similar 
reactions to the same topics. The part where identity majorly affected responses, was 
related to a hypothetical initiative by an international party to solve the conflict. Despite 
the absence of an effect resulting from the survey experiment. The effect was also present 
in the perception of the UN’s role in the conflict. Despite the agreement on its weak role 
in the Syrian case, the Arabic participants generally perceived the UN as predominantly 
supporting the Assad regime more than the Kurds. The Arabic identity participants, on 
the other hand, had more of a negative collective attitude towards the UN’s role. 
Therefore, it seems the reaction to initiatives presented by external parties and the attitude 
towards those parties was affected by the person’s identity.  
However, it is important to reiterate that individual variables, such as migratory and post-
conflict support preferences, were not affected by the identity of the participants. When 
there is no collective effect of a variable like migration or individual support preference, 
the participants responded in similar ways regardless of their identity. Only other factors 
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like the economic situation or the consequences of the war, had an effect on shaping 
migratory and post-conflict support preferences.    
This information has some important implications for future interventions in Syrian. 
Firstly, initiatives presented by an international party should consider which segment or 
group within Syrian society should present the proposed solution. Despite some 
promising initiatives that could potential generate considerable progress, can often be 
rejected by some local groups when the presenting party is perceived as threatening their 
own identity. A neutral international party can gain more support for an initiative when 
it is perceived as no threat to the major collective identities. 
This research can also be utilized to guide future endeavors focusing on issues such as 
migration and post conflict support for the Syrian community. To demonstrate that both 
groups had similar reactions to those issues despite the different circumstances they each 
are facing and hence guide a comprehensive solution for the future. The importance paid 
to the different identities should be subverted and more attention should be targeted 
towards economic and educational support for the return of Syrians refugees, to their 
homes and the reconstruction of post-war Syria.  
46 
 
8. Appendix 
Ordered logistic regression with the attitude towards the initiative as the dependent 
variable and the ethnicity and the treatment as the independent variables. 
 (1) 
  
treatment_indicator - 0.135 
 (0.226) 
Arab_indicator - 0.766 ** 
 (0.24) 
Observations 118 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
 
Regression results for the perception of the UN’s role as the dependent variable and 
ethnicity as the independent variable. 
 (1) 
  
Arab_indicator - 1.2 ** 
 (0.26) 
Observations 118 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
 
Regression results for losing a close friend or a family member, or facing a financial 
loss as the dependent variable and the ethnicity as the independent variable. 
 (1) (2) 
   
Arab_indicator - 0.044  - 0.042  
 (0.049) (0.087) 
Observations 118  
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
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Regression results for the financial loss as the dependent variable and ethnicity as the 
independent variable. 
 (1) 
  
Arab_indicator - 0.042  
 (0.087) 
Observations 118 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
 
Regression results for the training or funding support for the post-conflict as the 
dependent variable and ethnicity as the independent variable. 
 (1) 
  
Arab_indicator - 0.099  
 (0.141) 
Observations 118 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
 
T test for the treatment control groups: 
Variable Control M Treatment M t Sig. (p) 
     
Age 32.38 32.51 0.57 0.565 
Gender 0.68 0.68 -0.07 0.941 
Ethnicity 0.55 0.62 -0.77 0.440 
Losing a person 1.90 1.94 -0.98 0.327 
Financial loss 0.21 0.25 -0.53 0.596 
Observations 118    
Significance in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
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Sabancı University 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Study Title: Identity’s Effect on the Conflict in Syria 
Principal Investigator: Ayham Alhuseen, Sabancı University 
Dear Participant, 
This project is a part of an MA thesis which aims to gain a better understanding of 
the role that the different identities that exist in Syria plays in shaping the people’s 
attitudes towards the conflict in Syria. 
For this purpose, we will give you a survey that will take approximately 15 
minutes. 
All your answers to this survey will be kept confidential and not shared with anyone 
from within or outside of Sabancı University. The information collected for this 
project will be used for only research purposes. 
This project has been approved by Sabancı University Research Ethics Council. The 
survey does not include uncomfortable questions. However, during the survey if, 
for any reason, you feel uncomfortable please let the interviewer know or you can 
stop answering the questions. 
You can contact Ayham Alhuseen, a student at Sabancı University Faculty of Arts 
and Social Sciences the program of conflict analysis and resolution, to receive more 
information about the study by email at  ayham@sabanciuniv.edu. 
 If you believe that your rights have been violated in any way, please contact Cengiz 
Kaya, Director of Research and Graduate Policy at Sabancı University at (216) 483-
9666 or by email at cengizkaya@sabanciuniv.edu.    
 I participate in this survey voluntarily and understand that I can stop 
at any point I choose. I consent to my answers being used for research 
purposes. 
o Yes 
 
Date________________ 
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 جامعة سابانجي
 نموذج الموافقة على المشاركة في دراسة بحثية
 أثر الهوية على موقف السوريين من النزاع في سورية. عنوان الدراسة:
 جامعة سابانجي. –أيهم الحسين  الباحث الرئيسي:
 عزيزي المشارك،
الذي تلعبه الهويات المتعددة  ف إلى الوصول إلى فهم أفضل للدورإن هذا الاستبيان هو جزء من دراسة لرسالة ماجستير تهد
 سوريا في تشكيل مواقف الناس من النزاع في سوريا. في
 دقيقة لملئه. 51لهذا الغرض سنقدم لكم استبيانا يستغرق تقريبا 
عليها أو مشاركتها مع أي شخص ها في هذا الاستبيان ولن يتم الاطلاع ونسيتم المحافظة على سرية كافة المعلومات التي ستقدم
 سواء داخل أو خارج جامعة سابانجي. سيتم استخدام المعلومات المقدمة لأغراض بحثية فقط.
هذا المشروع قد تمت الموافقة عليه من قبل مجلس الأخلاق البحثية في جامعة سابانجي. الاستبيان لا يحتوي على أي أسئلة 
 ة لأي سبب كان يمكنكم إخبار الباحث أو التوقف عن ملء الاستبيان.محرجة. ولكن في حال شعرتم بعدم الراح
للمزيد من المعلومات يمكنكم التواصل مع أيهم الحسين وهو طالب في جامعة سابانجي في كلية الفنون والعلوم الاجتماعية في 
 ude.vinuicnabas@mahyaبرنامج حل وتحويل النزاعات على الإيميل 
إذا أحسستم بأنه تم انتهاك أي من حقوقكم يمكنكم التواصل مع جنكيز كايا مدير سياسات الأبحاث والدراسات العليا في جامعة 
أو عبر الإيميل على العنوان  6669-384 )612(سابانجي عبر الهاتف على الرقم 
 .ude.vinuicnabas@ayakzignec
 
أشارك بهذا الاستبيان بشكل طوعي وأعلم بأنه يمكنني التوقف في أي وقت كان. 
 وأوافق على استخدام إجاباتي لأغراض بحثية.
 نعم o
 
 التاريخ_______________
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